HALCYON

>> DFIR // CASEFILE_ROOT

Root-level server compromise, investigated and evicted

A client's hosting server was compromised at root and a previous "cleanup" had not actually removed the attacker. I reconstructed roughly seven weeks of undetected access, catalogued the persistence, and wrote the eviction runbook plus a formal DFIR report.

• rogue root SSH key surviving the first restore
• self-healing cron job re-minting revoked API tokens
• hidden shell accounts posing as system users
• rootkit-aware method: verify the binaries before trusting their output

DWELL TIME ~7 WEEKS :: IOCs CATALOGUED 10+

>> AUDIT

83

Critical / High findings, confirmed then closed

A full application security audit of the flagship ERP. Every finding verified as reachable, then remediated. The audit doubled as the worklist for a months-long hardening program.

METHOD 24-STAGE ANALYSIS

>> SQLI // ATTACK SURFACE

5,578

Injectable query sites mapped in one codebase

Against about 166 parameterized statements. An abstract risk turned into a countable, closeable worklist, then closed with a regression-safe recipe across 400 to 500 files per app.

GUARDS DEPLOYED UP TO 1,046 / APP

>> ACCESS CONTROL

10/10

Fleet-wide IDOR shutdown

The UI hid unauthorized menus, but any logged-in user could open any module by URL, finance screens included. Built a folder-level gate that fails closed and shipped it to all ten apps.

VERIFIED AGAINST 3,275 PERMISSION ROWS

>> RCE

0day left open

Unauthenticated upload RCE, closed

File importers reachable without login wrote uploads under their original names into web-served directories. Auth gates, strict allowlists, safe renaming, and script execution disabled in every upload folder.

VALIDATED WITH REAL MULTIPART UPLOADS

>> DATA EXPOSURE

120+

Anonymous export endpoints re-gated

Print, PDF, and spreadsheet exports had login checks commented out, serving financial data to anyone who asked. Every live endpoint now answers unauthorized requests with a 403.

SCOPE PER APPLICATION

>> MIGRATION // LEAST PRIVILEGE

Access rebuilt for 118 real users

Rebuilt user permissions by semantically mapping 706 distinct legacy menu grants out of a 22,000-row legacy table into the current schema: 3,275 rows migrated. An earlier ID-based copy looked fine and was quietly wrong; it got caught and rolled back before anyone inherited access they should not have.

ROWS MIGRATED 3,275 :: USERS 118

>> CSRF // DEFENSE IN DEPTH

Global CSRF layer, plus the three regressions it caused

Per-session tokens, automatic AJAX injection, central verification. Then the honest part: the rollout broke things in subtle ways, and I root-caused all three regression classes. A token silently truncated by PHP's max_input_vars on huge forms. A sanitizer that poisoned the commit stack on empty input. A report page that reloaded jQuery at runtime and wiped the token prefilter. Each one fixed fleet-wide.

REGRESSION CLASSES ROOT-CAUSED 3

>> CORPORATE ROLLOUT

Coding agents on enterprise production servers

Putting an AI agent on a corporate host is a compliance problem wearing a technical costume, and I treat it that way. Audit the floor first: kernel and libc versions, CPU instruction sets, hosting panel and firewall stacks. Open exactly one API endpoint through egress policy and prove it with a live handshake. Authenticate with headless tokens, because production boxes do not get interactive logins.

TARGET ENTERPRISE LINUX // CPANEL STACKS

>> AGENT INFRASTRUCTURE

Gateways, HUDs, and control surfaces

Self-hosted agent gateways reachable from a chat app. An operations HUD that wraps headless agents over a live application fleet and a knowledge vault. The lab systems double as staging: what survives there is what lands on corporate metal.

SYSTEMS OPENCLAW // NEURALGRID

>> MULTI-AGENT PRACTICE

Agent swarms as an engineering discipline

I run adversarial review workflows where agents hunt for defects and other agents try to refute the findings, so only verified problems survive. One review ran 28 agents in a single pass; another caught 22 real bugs in a gateway before it shipped. The fleet hardening program ran on the same machinery, pairing deterministic code transforms with adversarial verification at a scale no single reviewer can match.

PEAK SWARM 28 AGENTS :: CONFIRMED BUGS IN ONE REVIEW 22